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INTRODUCTION
In December, 1995, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
President Clinton must stand trial for the sexual harassment suit filed
against him by Paula Corbin Jones. The court of appeals centered its
argument for refusing to afford any type of protection to President Clinton
on what it believed was the relevant and binding law regarding immunity
for executive branch officials. This Note, however, argues that the court of
appeals erred in holding that President Clinton must stand trial and defend
his case during the term of his presidency.
Part I sets out the basic concepts of immunity, both absolute and
qualified, and proceeds to provide the relevant historical precedent
regarding legislative, judicial, and executive immunity. The discussion
regarding executive immunity covers Supreme Court precedent from 1895
to the watershed case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald493 in 1982. Part I focuses on
Nixon v. Fitzgeraldbecause both the district court and the court of appeals
rely most heavily on this case in their respective opinions in Jones v.
Clinton.49 4
Part II discusses the district court and the court of appeals opinions in
Jones v. Clinton. Part III presents the argument that the court of appeals
erred in overturning the district court's order to stay the proceedings until
the end of President Clinton's term of office. This argument has two
elements: (1) that the court of appeals both misinterpreted and dismissed
binding precedent; and (2) that the district court has the discretion to delay
proceedings. Therefore, the court of appeals abused its discretion by
interfering with that decision.
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PART I
Immunity From Suit
United States government officials generally have been protected from
suit by either absolute or qualified immunity. The Supreme Court has
recognized both absolute and qualified immunity, depending on the
official's office and duties. 495 An official enjoys absolute immunity as
long as he or she is acting within the ambit of official duty. If the official
receives protection from suit through absolute immunity, the motive of the
official's conduct is irrelevant, and the immunity operates as a complete
bar from suit.4 96 However, depending on the factual situation, the
immunity may be qualified.4 97 Determining qualified immunity often
includes consideration of the scope of discretion of the official and the
responsibilities of that official's office. 4 98 If the official passes the "test"
for qualified
immunity, he will effectively enjoy total immunity from
499
suit.
The Supreme Court has justified immunity for government officials on
various grounds. For instance, the Court has found that it would be unfair
to subject officials to liability for acts which they are required to perform
using their own discretion, 50 0 in part, reasoning that officials may hesitate
to make decisions for fear of civil liability. 50 1 The Court has also justified
the grant of immunity on a separation of powers analysis; i.e., that
litigation may cause an unnecessary loss of time and resources which
should instead be dedicated to conducting official duties. 50 2 Finally, the
Court has concluded that subjecting 5officials
to civil liability could result
03
in frivolous and vindictive litigation.
Legislative Immunity
The Constitution provides the basis for immunity for federal
legislators. Members of Congress enjoy absolute immunity from both
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monetary damages and injunctive relief.50 4 Article I, Section 6 has been
interpreted to give legislators immunity in two ways. 50 5 First, except for
treason, felony, or breach of the peace, the Arrest Clause protects
legislators from arrest during attendance at sessions and while they travel
to and from those sessions. 50 6 Second, the Speech and Debate Clause
provides immunity to senators and representatives for what is said during
legislative debate.50 7 The Supreme Court has also interpreted the Speech
and Debate Clause to include all activity50 in
either house of Congress
8
house.
that
before
business
to
which relates
Judicial Immunity
The Constitution is silent regarding immunity for federal judges;
judicial immunity evolved out of common law. 50 9 In England, judges
possessed absolute immunity based on the maxim that "the King can do
no wrong," since judges were instruments of the king. 510 Further, the
English recognized judicial immunity for activities performed by a
judge.51'
The Supreme Court has imitated the English common law in
recognizing judicial immunity. 512 So long as a judge has proper
jurisdiction, he is immune from suit for all of his judicial acts, regardless
of intent or motive; bad faith is irrelevant. 513 For example, in Pierson v.
504 Ann Woolhandler, Pattersof Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES.

L. REV. 396, 400 (1987).
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shall not be questioned in any other Place." Id.
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Ray,5 14 the Supreme Court awarded absolute immunity to a state judge in
a suit based on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1983. 5 15 The justification for this absolute immunity is "not for the
protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of
the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to
exercise their functions with independence and without fear of
consequences." 5 16 The protection of absolute immunity prevents
unnecessary second-guessing and needless interference. 517 Admittedly
there exists a potential risk for abuse, but the mechanism of impeachment
acts as a check on the judiciary's power.518
Executive Immunity
Similar to judicial immunity, the Constitution lacks guidance for
providing immunity to members of the executive branch, including the
President. Hence, immunity must be grounded in the common law. 5 19 As
one scholar has noted, there are two important considerations. First, there
is the concern that an executive official wields the power to deprive a
citizen of liberty or property, often "without prior judicial determination
of the legality of [the] action. 5 20 Conversely, there arises the problem of
protecting an official's discretion to make decisions inherent in the nature
of his office.5 2 '
Because of these competing considerations, the case law regarding
immunity for executive branch officials is, not surprisingly, inconsistent
and confusing. While early Supreme Court precedent provided absolute
immunity across the board for executive officials, 522 27 the Court has
52 3
recently held that some officials are entitled to qualified immunity only.
Nevertheless, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme
Court provided the
524
President with the protection of absolute immunity.
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The case law on executive immunity dates back to 1895. In Spalding v.
Vilas, the Supreme Court ruled that federal officers of the executive
branch were entitled to absolute immunity.52 5 In Spalding,the Postmaster
General, who was at the time a member of the President's cabinet, was
sued for defamation. 526 The Court found that since the alleged misconduct
fell within the Postmaster527General's authority, he was entitled to absolute
immunity from civil suit.
As with its rulings regarding immunity for judges, the Spalding Court
based its decision on notions of "public policy and convenience." 52' Like a
judge, an executive officer should not have to fear liability for civil
damages and the risk that plaintiffs will consider an officer's motives
when he makes discretionary decisions.5 2 9 Following this decision, the
courts generally conferred absolute immunity for executive officers;
however, such immunity was given
only so long as the officer acted
530
authority.
his
of
scope
within the
Over sixty years later in Barr v. Matteo, a plurality of the Supreme
Court extended absolute immunity to officials below the cabinet rank by
awarding absolute immunity to an executive official who had been sued
for defamation based on a press release. 53 1 Once again, finding that motive
should not be a factor, the Court considered the same justifications for
executive immunity that it had considered for judicial immunity: "The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader,
or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's
speculation as to motives." 532 Further, the Court asserted that the level in
which the executive branch official works is irrelevant; one of the
purposes behind
immunity is to "aid in the effective functioning of
533
government."
In 1974 the Supreme Court retreated on its policy of providing
executive branch officials absolute immunity in Scheuer v. Rhodes.534 For
the first time, the Court limited the protection to qualified immunity. In
Scheuer, the Court considered whether to award immunity to various state
525 Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498.
5 26

Id.

at 486.

527 Id. at 498. For a discussion on the historical roots of executive officials' immunity
beginning with Spalding, see example, Allen, supra note 13; Aviva A. Orenstein, Note,
PresidentialImmunity from CivilLiability,68 CORNELL L. REv. 236 (1983); Stein, supra
note
18; Laura H. Burney, Case Note, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1145 (1983).
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510 Stein, supra note 18, at 764.
531 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 565, 572 (1959).
532Id. at 575 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951)).
533 Barr,360 U.S. at 572-73.
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executive officers. 535 The case arose out of the civil unrest at Kent State
University in May, 1970.536 The plaintiffs were families of those who died
in the incident, and they sued the Chief Executive Officer of the state of
Ohio, the officers and enlisted personnel
of Ohio's National Guard, and
537
the President of Kent State University.
The case differed from prior suits involving officials' immunity in that
it involved state rather than federal executive officers. Additionally, the
plaintiffs in Scheuer based their claims on alleged violations of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These two facts played
a considerable role in the Court's decision as it looked at the functions and
responsibilities of the particular defendants as well as the purpose behind
538
The Court found that Congress enacted § 1983 to protect
§ 1983..
citizens from civil rights abuses by state officials. 539 Although the Court
recognized that the higher the executive officer, the more complex and
discretionary his or her decisions, the Court still found that the best
solution in this case was to confer only qualified immunity. 540 The Court
held that a state officer can assert qualified immunity as a defense, and the
Court will look at whether the officer possessed a good-faith belief that
his or her conduct was lawful. If so, the officer will be granted
immunity. 54 1 The Scheuer test was criticized because the defendants
objected to opening up their thought processes for review, and the
plaintiffs found it difficult to fulfill their burden of proving bad faith.542
The Supreme Court added an objective element to the test in Wood v.
Strickland.543 In Wood, a student sued a school board member under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and the Court held that the school board member could
claim qualified immunity. 544 The Court required, however, that the
plaintiff demonstrate that the officer knew or should have known that he
was abridging the plaintiffs constitutional rights. 545 Therefore, for § 1983
suits against state executive branch officials, the test consisted of two
alternate parts: (1) the subjective element as to whether the official acted
with malice; or (2) the objective element as to whether the official knew
or should have known that his acts violated the law. If a court determined
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that there existed either malice or a knowledge of546wrongdoing, then the
official would be denied the privilege of immunity.
The Court eventually eliminated the subjective element of the test in
547 Therefore, motive is now irrelevant. The Harlow
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.
Court instead expounded a two-step analysis. A court must first determine
whether the statutory or constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff was
clear at the time of the alleged unlawful conduct. 541 If that threshold
question is met, the court must then consider whether the executive
official knew or should have known his conduct was illegal.549
The Supreme Court did not retreat to a policy of qualified immunity
for state prosecutors. In Imbler v. Pachtman, a citizen filed suit against a
state prosecutor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the prosecutor
unfairly and unjustifiably initiated and pursued a criminal prosecution
against him. 550 The Court conferred absolute immunity for the prosecutor,
relying on the same considerations that underlie the common law
immunities for judges acting within the scope of their duties. 55 1 A
prosecutor could not adequately perform his duties if he constantly feared
civil suit from disgruntled citizens because "[i]f the prosecutor could be
made to answer in court each time such a person charged him with
wrongdoing, his energy and attention
would be diverted from the pressing
552
duty of enforcing the criminal law."

It is important to note that the Imbler Court turned the analysis into
one of function rather than office. If an executive official's job involved
"quasi-judicial" functions, then he would be protected by absolute
553
immunity; otherwise, he had to satisfy the test for qualified immunity.
Note, however, that the Court did suggest that a prosecutor would not
enjoy the protection of absolute immunity for duties not considered
"quasi-judicial," for example, administrative or investigative duties. 554
The Supreme Court applied this new "functional approach" to
executive officials in Butz v. Economou.555 The case involved a
constitutional tort claim against an officer of the Department of
46Id.at 322; Stein, supra note 18, at 766.
547 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
5 48

Id. at 818.

549 Id.
550 Imbler
55 1
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v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976).

[d. at 423.

Id. at 425.

553 Stein, supra note 18, at 767.
554 Stein, supra note 18, at 768.

"We have no occasion to consider whether like or
similar reasons require immunity of those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that
cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of
advocate." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-3 1.
555 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).

Agriculture. 556 The Court reviewed the case law and asserted that these
officials should not enjoy absolute immunity when they abridge a citizen's
constitutional rights. 557 The Court refused to allow executive officials to
use their office as an excuse to avoid liability, for the Court stated that
"[n]o man in this country is so high that he is above the law." 558 Therefore,
the executive
official could claim qualified, rather than absolute
559
immunity.
In 1982, the Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue of immunity
560 In
for the President of the United States in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.
Fitzgerald,the Court for the first time considered the scope of immunity
from civil suit for a President. 56 1 The case involved the plaintiff, A. Ernest
Fitzgerald, who lost his job as an employee of the Department of the Air
Force. 562 Fitzgerald sued various government officials, including former
President Richard M. Nixon, alleging that the government wrongfully
discharged563him in retaliation for his truthful testimony in front of
Congress.
In deciding Fitzgerald,the Court considered at length the Constitution,
legislative history, case law, the separation of powers doctrine, and public
policy. In a 5-4 decision the Court determined that the President 564
should
suits.
damages
civil
from
immunity
absolute
of
protection
enjoy the
Writing for the plurality, Justice Powell began by considering the
relevant precedent regarding executive immunity. 565 According to Powell,
the law had developed to provide qualified immunity for executive branch
officials, with the exception, first clearly articulated in Imbler, that under a
556

ld. at 480.
Id. at 494.
558
Id. at 506 (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)).
559
Id. at 507.
560 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). In 1979, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit addressed the question of presidential immunity, but found, under a functional
analysis, that the President could enjoy the privilege of only qualified immunity. Halprin
v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court stated that the Constitution is
silent and provides no indication that the framers intended immunity for the President.
Id. at 1211. Further, the court explained that although the doctrine of separation of
powers requires limited interference among the branches, the branches are not "entirely
insulated from each other." Id. at 1212. Finally, the court found that a justification of
immunity based on the risk of frivolous suits was unfounded, and did not provide a
strong enough basis for allowing the President an excuse from defending himself in civil
suits. Id. at 1213.
55 7

561 Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 741.
5 62
5 63
5 64

Id. at 733.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 749.

565 See supra notes 27-67 and accompanying text for discussion of the historical
precedents of executive immunity.

functional analysis, those who performed "quasi-judicial"
activities would
566
be given the full protection of absolute immunity.

As Powell explained, in addition to case law concerning immunity for
other executive officials, the Constitution, federal statutes, and history
provided guidance. 567 Because the Presidency did not exist through most
of the development of the common law, the analysis must also come from
this country's constitutional heritage and structure. 568 Powell explained
that such an inquiry must include a public policy analysis: an analysis that
"involves policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the
nature of the President's office in a system structured to achieve effective
56 9
government under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers."
The Court found unpersuasive the argument that, since the
Constitution explicitly provides immunity for members of Congress, the
framers must not have intended such immunity for the President, or they
would have included it in the Constitution as well. 570 As the Court
explained, a specific textual basis has never been required as a
prerequisite for immunity. In fact, the Court had found absolute immunity
for judges as well as executive officials with quasi-judicial functions,
57 1
regardless of the Constitution's failure to provide such immunity.
Powell also maintained that there is historical evidence implying that
the Framers intended the President to be immune from civil damages
suits.572 For example, there is evidence that at the Constitutional
Convention several delegates asserted that the impeachment clause was
improper because it would impair the President's capacity to perform his
duties. 573 Further, the Court pointed to the views of some Constitutional
Convention delegates who stated that "the President, personally, was not
the subject to any process whatever ... [for that] would ... put it in the
power of a common justice to exercise
any authority over him and stop the
574
whole machine of Government."
In addition to the historical support for some form of presidential
immunity, Powell rested his argument on the recognition that the

Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 744-47.
Id. at 747-48.
568
Id. at 748.
566

567

569 Id.

570

d. at 750 n.31.
Id. See supra notes 17-26 and 58-67 and accompanying text for discussion of the case
law on judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.
572 Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 750 n.31.
573 Id. (citing 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 64
(1911)
(remarks of Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pickney)).
574
Id. (citing JOURNAL OF MACLAY 167 (E. Maclay ed., 1890)).
571
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President holds a unique position under the Constitution. 575 Powell relies
on this concept to support two arguments for immunity: (1) the President
cannot make important and discretionary decisions if he is in constant fear
of civil liability, and (2) diverting the President's time and attention with a
private civil suit affects the functioning of the entire federal government,
thereby abrogating
the separation of powers mandated by the
57 6
Constitution.

As Powell explained, the President has supervisory duties and special
responsibilities entrusted to no other officer of the government; he is the
577
penultimate member of the executive branch under the Constitution.
The President faces issues and makes decisions on matters that are farreaching, very sensitive, and "likely to 'arouse the most intense
feelings."' 578 It is in the public interest for the President to have the
opportunity to make these decisions efficiently, skillfully, and without fear
of civil liability. 579 Invoking this same reasoning, Powell refuted the
argument that the President should be entitled to only qualified immunity
like other executive officials who do not perform quasi-judicial
functions. 58 0 Powell explained that, unlike cabinet members or state
governors, the President is the only member of the executive branch with
such an exalted status, and he is the only one in a singular
position that
581
nation.
entire
the
affecting
decisions
critical
can make
This argument that the President holds a unique position under the
Constitution is equally relevant to the separation of powers argument.
Powell found historical evidence which supported the Court's argument
that the separation of powers doctrine mandates presidential immunity
from civil liability. While the Constitution does not specifically set forth
the separation of powers doctrine, the theory is well established that the
executive, judicial, and legislative branches are equal and will not intrude

Id. at 749. Powell specifically pointed to Article II, section 1 of the Constitution
which vests the executive power in the President. Id. at 750. Professor Laura Krugman
Ray notes that the majority used the word "unique" four times in three pages. She states
that this can be attributed to the importance that the majority put on the fact that the court
must distinguish the office of the President from those other executive officials who are
protected only by qualified immunity. Laura Krugman Ray, From Prerogative to
Accountability: The Amenability of the President to Suit, 80 KY. L.J. 738, 779 (19911992).
576 See Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 750-52.
577 Id. at 750. Powell further listed some of the more important and discretionary duties,
such as enforcement of federal law, the conducting of foreign affairs, and the
management
of the executive branch. Id.
5 78
Id. at 751-52 (Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
5 79
Id. at 752.
580
Id. at 751.
581
1 d. at 752.
575

110

upon each other. 582 As President Thomas Jefferson argued in opposition to
Chief Justice Marshall's holding in United States v. Burr:
The leading principle of our Constitution is the
independence of the [1]egislature, executive and judiciary
of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the
judiciary. But would the executive be independent of the
judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter,
& to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts
could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly
trudging from north to south & east to west, and withdraw
him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of
the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of
the others, is further manifested by the means it has
furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force
attempted on them by the others, and to none has it given
more effectual
or diversified means than to the
58 3
executive.
In addition, Justice Joseph Story held it implicit in the separation of
powers that the President be able to discharge his duties without the
interference of private lawsuits:
There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive
department, which are necessarily implied from the nature
of the functions, which are confided to it. Among these,
must necessarily be included the power to perform them..
. . The [P]resident cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest,
imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of
the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person must
be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official
inviolability.5 8 4
Powell admitted that the separation of powers doctrine does not
prohibit every exercise of judicial power over the President. 585 Therefore,
Powell looked to the balancing test set forth in Nixon v. Administrator of
586
Under that test, before a court may exercise
General Services.
582

583

Id. at 753.
Id. at 750 n.31 (citing 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 404 (P. Ford ed., 1905)

(quoting a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial)). In the United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692), with Chief Justice Marshall
sitting at trial as Circuit Justice, the court considered the question of whether a subpoena
duces
tecum could be issued to the President.
584
Id. at 749, 750 n.31 (citing 3 JUSTICE STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1563, at 418-19 (Ist ed., 1833)).
585 Id. at 753-54.
586

Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).

jurisdiction over the President, it "must balance the constitutional weight
of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the
authority and functions of the Executive Branch. 5 87 Powell deduced that
when using this balancing analysis in a criminal prosecution, the balance
would weigh in favor of permitting prosecution and allowing the judiciary
to interfere with the executive. However, when the case is merely a
private civil suit, the dangers of "intrusions on the authority and functions"
588
of the President and the executive branch outweigh those interests.
Subjecting the President to private civil suit would result in a diversion
of his energies and would "raise unique risks to the effective functioning
of government." 589 No one can say how long the trial process would take
or whether the claim was frivolous. Furthermore:
[I]t is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded
until the case has been tried, and to submit all officials, the
innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to
the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the
590
ardor of all but the most resolute ....
Finally, Powell argued that because of the visibility of the President, he
stands as
open target for harassing and possibly politically motivated civil
91
suits.

5

Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion rested solely on the
separation of powers argument. Burger argued that there is support in the
Constitution for absolute immunity, and that it is not a doctrine derived
from common law or public policy. 592 Burger asserted that the essential
reason for separation of powers among the three branches is to prevent
"risk of control, interference, or intimidation by other branches."' 593
Therefore, to allow the judiciary to intrude upon the functioning of the
executive branch through private civil suits would be contrary to the

587

Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at 754 (construing Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433

U.S.
at 443, and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-13 (1974)).
588
Id. at 754.
589
Id. at 751.
59°Id. at 751 n.32 (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949)).
591 Id. at 753. Powell stated in a footnote that the dangers of suit, whether legitimate or
not, are significant, although there is little historical record to support this conclusion, as

the right to sue federal officials has only been recognized since the early 1970s when the
Supreme Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). Id. at 753 n.33.
592 Id. at 760 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
593

Id. at 760-61.

purpose of separation
unconstitutional.5 94

of powers, and is thus impermissible and

In sum, the Supreme Court, although divided, held that President
Nixon was absolutely immune from liability in civil suits so long as they
involved conduct related to presidential executive authority. 595 Powell
596
emphasized that the ruling would not put the President above the law.
In addition, the public still has protection from abuse through the power of
impeachment,
not to mention the constant and unwavering scrutiny by the
597
media.
Writing for the dissent in Fitzgerald, Justice White forcefully
proclaimed that the plurality erred in its analysis supporting absolute
immunity for the President. White found importance in presidential
accountability as well as the power of the Court to provide a remedy to
those who have been injured.5 98 White asserted that based on precedent
and the functional analysis previously pronounced by the Court, the
President neither deserves nor needs the protection of absolute
immunity. 599 He is neither legislator nor judge, and the performance of his
duties does not involve "quasi-judicial" functions. 600 White claimed that
the plurality's decision could not be grounded in the Constitution, history,
or precedent, but that it was grounded almost completely in public policy.
Such judicial activism was improper. 60 1 White argued that if the60President
2
was to enjoy any immunity at all, it must be qualified immunity.

PART II
Jones v. Clinton--District Court Opinion
On May 6, 1994, Paula Corbin Jones brought a civil action against the
sitting President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in federal
594

Id. Burger also emphasized that this impermissibility of intrusion by the judiciary into
the affairs of the executive branch is especially true in the case of the President, as his
office is a unique one, and he wields far more discretionary authority than any other

official.
5 95

596

Id. at 755.

Id. at 758 n.41. Powell conceded that absolute immunity may infringe upon the rights
of the opposing parties. However, the same infringement occurs when the Court confers
absolute immunity upon judges and executive officials with quasi-judicial functions. Id.
at 754 n.37. Further, as Powell explained, the Court has recognized a lesser public
interest in civil suits than in criminal prosecutions. Id.
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See id. at 766.
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602
Id. at 764.
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district court in Arkansas. 603 Because Jones' case involved the President of
the United States, the district court anticipated a claim of immunity.
President Clinton filed a motion to dismiss and the court agreed to hold
off on any further proceedings until the court made its decision regarding
immunity. 604 Hence, the issue before the district court was whether Jones
could sue the President of the United States while he held that office but
where the factual basis for the complaint 6arose
before his assumption of
05
that office and was unrelated to that office.
President Clinton petitioned the district court for a dismissal without
prejudice with the agreement that the statute of limitations would be
tolled.60 6 After considering the common law, the United States
Constitution, legislative history, and recent precedent, the district court
was unwilling to grant President Clinton immunity from suit. The court
decided, however, to stay the proceedings with the caveat that discove 7 ,
including depositions, must proceed in order to preserve the evidence.
In arriving at its decision, the district court performed an analysis similar
6 °8 However, the
to that performed by the Supreme Court in Fitzgerald.
analysis had to be modified since the conduct, as alleged, did not fall
within the scope of President Clinton's official duties as President; the
alleged conduct occurred before he even took office. 609 As the Court in
Fitzgerald found, while the Constitution provides immunity for official
conduct by a member of Congress, 6 1 it does not explicitly provide
immunity for the President. 611 Therefore, an examination of the legislative
history contributes little to the analysis. There is evidence to support the
notion that the Framers never intended to give the President
protection,
6 12
contention.
opposite
the
for
support
while there is similar
Consequently, the district court referred to and heavily relied on, the
613 First, the
watershed case on presidential immunity, Nixon v. Fitzgerald.
Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 691 (E.D. Ark. 1994). The plaintiff, Paula Jones,
also filed suit against Danny Ferguson, an Arkansas state trooper. Id. This case note
does
604 not discuss that portion of her suit.
Id. at 692.
603

605 Id.

Id. Clinton wanted the entire case dismissed until he finished his term(s) as President;
he
was not asking for absolute immunity from suit. Id.
6 07
Id. at 699.
608 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
606

609 Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 697.
610 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6

(Speech and Debate Clause). See also supra notes 12-16

and accompanying text.

611 Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 694.
612 See Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at

764 (White, J., dissenting). See also id. at 750-51 n.31
(discussing historical legislative support for immunity of the President).
613 Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 697. For a complete examination of the Supreme
Court's
holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, see discussion supra notes 68-110 and accompanying
text.

district court referred to the Supreme Court's finding that the President
holds a unique position and that diverting the President's time and energy
affects the entire executive branch.614 Second, the court used Fitzgeraldto
support a separation of powers analysis to arrive at the conclusion
that
615
President Clinton should not stand trial during his term of office.
The district court remained within the bounds of Fitzgeraldin holding
that the President cannot use absolute immunity to protect himself from
civil suit when the charges are unrelated to his official duties as
President. 616 In fact, the court stated that "nowhere in the Constitution,
congressional acts, or the writings of any judges or scholar" can one find
credible support for granting immunity from liability for the type of
allegations with which President Clinton has been charged.617 Granting
absolute or qualified immunity to President Clinton would not only run
against precedent, but it also would result in a618form of judicial activism in
which the district court refused to participate.
The district court relied on the Fitzgerald Court's emphasis that the
619
President holds a position unlike any other government officer.
Although the President enjoys the help of the administrative bureaucracy,
a civil suit like this could easily cripple the office. 620 The singular
importance of the position of President means that a diversion of
presidential energies to such
a lawsuit would impair the functioning of the
62 1
entire federal government.
From this the court moved to the separation of powers analysis, using
that reasoning to support its holding to stay the proceedings until President
Clinton finishes his term of office. 622 Under the balancing test set out in
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services and affirmed in Fitzgerald,
defending a civil suit is an intrusion on the duties of the President and the
functioning of the executive branch that is not outweighed by the public
interest. 623 As the court admitted, the Fitzgerald opinion involved a suit
for conduct while Nixon was in office; Jones does not. However, the court
pointed out that a separation of powers analysis, the notion that the
judiciary must refrain from intruding on the functioning
of the executive
624
suit.
the
of
basis
the
of
branch, applies regardless
614 Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 697.
61
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Finally, the district court noted that delaying the trial would not harm
Jones' right to recover or cause undue inconvenience. 625 The parties were
still required to move forward with discovery, including depositions, so as
to preserve the evidence. Hence, while the trial would be delayed, the
parties would 62have
their day in court once President Clinton finishes his
6
office.
term in
Jones v. Clinton--8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion
Although the district court's holding allowed President Clinton to
avoid standing trial while President, it did require discovery. President
Clinton therefore sought either a reversal on his motion to dismiss, i.e., a
dismissal without prejudice and a tolling of the statute of limitations, or,627
in
discovery.
stay
to
refusing
holding
the
on
reversal
a
alternative,
the
Jones filed a cross-appeal, requesting the appeals court to reverse the
district court's decision to stay the trial.62 8 The court of appeals not only
refused to stay the discovery but reversed the district court's holding and
ordered that the trial move forward. 629 The court of appeals held that
neither federal legislation nor the Constitution supported presidential
immunity when a lawsuit involves unofficial conduct. 630 The court
pointed out that the Supreme Court has never granted any type of
immunity to public officials for unofficial acts. 63 1 Like the district court,
632
the court of appeals relied heavily upon Nixon v. Fitzgerald.
Particularly, the appellate court based its opinion in part on Chief Justice
Burger's concurrence in Fitzgerald which asserted that the "absolute
immunity" afforded to the
President does not apply to acts outside the
633
President's official duties.
The court of appeals maintained that a careful reading of Fitzgerald
reveals that the real concern of the Court was that if the President were
amenable to suit for conduct within his official duties, it would have an
adverse influence on his decision-making because he would fear personal
liability for unpopular choices. 6 34 The court spoke of the special status of
the President and referred to the discussion in Fitzgerald about the
Id. The court intimated that there really is no urgency as Jones filed her claim just
two days before the statute of limitations was about to run. Id.
625

626 Id.

627 Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996).
628

Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1363.
630
Id. at 1358-59.
631
1d. at 1358.
632 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
633 Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1359 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Fitzgerald,457 U.S. at
759 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
6 29

634Jones, 72 F.3d at 1360.
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discretionary and sensitive decisions the President must make.6 35 As the
court pointed out, this rationale is inapplicable to cases such as President
Clinton's where his
alleged misconduct does not implicate presidential
6 36
decision-making.

The court of appeals also addressed the argument set forth in
Fitzgeraldthat the unique status of the President means that the diversion
of the President's time and energy would affect the entire executive
branch.637 However, the court practically dismissed this separation of
powers argument, asserting that the Supreme Court limited this analysis to
suits surrounding official acts only. 638 Consequently, the balancing
analysis set forth in Fitzgerald was discounted by the court. 6 39 The court
asserted that if such a balancing analysis were to take place, it was
President Clinton's burden to prove the degree of the intrusion. 640 The
court intimated that,64if1 given the opportunity, President Clinton could not
carry such a burden.
The appellate court also found unpersuasive the notion that the
President is an open target for frivolous, vexatious, and harassing
642 The court asserted that history
litigation, a risk discussed in Fitzgerald.
643
did not reveal such problematic litigation against past Presidents.
Further, the court argued that, compared to the number of people who
could sue the President for official conduct, the number of people who
could sue the President for unofficial acts is small since the number of
people who would involve themselves with him in a personal capacity
would be limited.644
Finally, the court of appeals emphasized Jones' right to sue: she has
constitutionally protected access to the courts. 6 4 5 The court stated that
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury. 646 According to the appellate court, to uphold the district court's
decision to stay the proceedings would impermissibly abridge this right.647
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Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
6 47
Id.at 1360.
Id.at
6 44
Id.at
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The court of appeals refused to affirm the district court's decision to
stay the proceedings. The court held that staying the proceeding was like
giving "temporary immunity" 648 when there was no such thing: "[a] sitting
President is either entitled to immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, or
he is not." 649 In the court's opinion, it is the Constitution which would
ordain such immunity, but it does not.65 Therefore, granting or denying
immunity to1 Clinton for his unofficial acts would to be an abuse of
65
discretion.
The heart of the concurring opinion was that Jones has a fundamental
right to use the judicial process.6 52 Since there is a risk that evidence may
be lost or witnesses may die or become incompetent, Jones faces a risk of
irreparable injury. 6 53 According to the concurring opinion, Jones has a
fundamental right to trial, and President Clinton's official duties do not
"override his permanent and fundamental duty as a citizen and as a debtor
654
to justice."
The dissent agreed with the district court's decision to stay the
proceedings. 65 5 The dissent asserted that the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Fitzgeraldwas instructional even though Jones involved unofficial rather
than official acts. 6 56 The dissenting opinion found persuasive the fact that
the "President occupies a unique position ... [that] distinguishes him from
other executive officials." 6 57 Considering this special status, the dissent
found that standing trial would affect the presidential office and the entire
executive branch.65 8 The dissent thus argued that the separation ofpowers
rationale articulated in Fitzgeraldjustified staying the proceedings.
The dissent referred to the Supreme Court's concern that the President
stands as an open target for frivolous and vexatious litigation. 660 The
dissent found that litigation may be pursued because of the very public
and political nature of the presidential office. 66 1 A plaintiff might file suit
merely to cause partisan disruption, to obtain unwarranted financial
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benefits, or even simply to obtain
the notoriety that comes with suing the
662
States.
United
the
of
President

PART III
The Court of Appeals Erred In Its Decision
The court of appeals erred when it reversed the district court's decision
and refused to stay the proceedings until the end of President Clinton's
term. 66 3 First, the court of appeals improperly dismissed important and
relevant parts of Nixon v. Fitzgerald regarding immunity based on the
doctrine of separation of powers. 664 Second, the court of appeals interfered
with the trial court's discretionary power to control its own docket.
As the court of appeals correctly noted, there is no precedent on point
addressing the situation presented by the Jones case, specifically whether
President Clinton should stand trial for a suit regarding unofficial
conduct. 66 5 The district court and court of appeals were both correct in
asserting that the law clearly would not provide absolute immunity for
Clinton's alleged misconduct. 666 There is no doubt that, in Fitzgerald,
Justice Powell did not intend for the Court's holding to be so broad. The
Fitzgerald Court limited absolute immunity to be conduct within the
"outer perimeter" of the President's duties. 667 To hold otherwise would
place the President above the law. The district court's holding, however,
did not grant absolute or qualified immunity; it only stayed the
proceedings until the end of President Clinton's term of office.668 Clinton
will still have to stand trial at the end of his term. While Fitzgeraldis not
squarely on point, it is instructive. The district court properly relied on it
in making its decision to stay the proceeding. However, the court of
appeal's opinion is flawed in that the court did not adequately recognize
the precedential value of the entire opinion.
In Fitzgerald the Supreme Court relied on various grounds for its
holding that the President would be absolutely immune from civil suit for
his official conduct. First, the Court found that although the President was
not a legislator, judge, or executive official with quasi-judicial duties, he
should enjoy immunity because of his unique status. 669 The President
662 Id.

663 See Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1367 (8th Cir. 1996) (Ross, J., dissenting).
664 See Jones, 72 F.3d at 1368 (Ross, J., dissenting).
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makes special, sensitive, and discretionary decisions which require
immunity. Absent immunity, it would be difficult to make these important
decisions without constantly fearing civil suits.67 As the court of appeals
noted, this reasoning would not apply to President Clinton's case. But the
court of appeals' analysis should not have ended there because it did not
address all the issues considered by the FitzgeraldCourt.
The Supreme Court in Fitzgeraldalso relied on the unique status of the
President to support a separation of powers argument.67 As the Court
pointed out in Fitzgerald, allowing a civil suit to proceed against the
President would divert the President's time and energy, effectively
disrupting the functioning of the entire executive branch. This would
improperly invade the powers of the executive branch.672
The court of appeals gave very little credit to this second rationale. In
fact, the court essentially found that the real, and possibly only, concern of
the Supreme Court in Fitzgeraldwas protecting the President's discretion
673
to make the decisions inherent in his position without fear of liability.
Further, the court of appeals found that the separation of powers line of
reasoning would not be applicable to President Clinton's case, for the
Fitzgerald opinion was limited to absolute immunity for official
presidential acts. 674 The court of appeals was wrong in denying the
instructional value of this analysis. A more reasonable interpretation of
Fitzgerald is that the holding of absolute immunity for the President is
limited to official activities; but the separation of powers reasoning can
still apply to other cases such as Jones v. Clinton.
This is best illustrated by performing the balancing analysis the
Fitzgerald Court adopted from Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services.67 5 In determining whether requiring Clinton to stand trial while
serving as President would be an improper intrusion by the judiciary, the
court must consider the "constitutional weight of the interest to be to
served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of
the executive branch. 6 76 Undeniably, Jones has an interest in having a
trial, and the public has an interest in holding the President accountable
for his actions outside of his official duties. However, the balance tips in
President Clinton's favor when one considers the magnitude of the
intrusion the suit would have on Clinton's duties as President and manager
of the entire executive branch.
670
671
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The court of appeals stated that Clinton would not need to be present
for a number of the pretrial and trial activities, 6 77 but this reasoning is
flawed. Why wouldn't President Clinton want to participate in the
discovery and trial of a sexual harassment suit against him? Activities
such as preparing for hearings, traveling to and from Arkansas for
hearings, responding to interrogatories, preparing for and taking
depositions, meeting with attorneys, and advising on trial strategy will
consume a large portion of the President's time at the expense of the entire
executive branch. The magnitude of intrusion such activities would
impose on President Clinton's duties outweighs both Jones' interest in
having a trial and the public's interest in holding the President accountable
for his unofficial acts. To allow a court to interfere with President
Clinton's duties and the workings of the entire executive branch would
violate the separation of powers between the three branches of the federal
government.
The court appeals thought it had solved the problem by directing the
district court to be flexible in its case management. 678 But this does not
solve the problem; the separation of powers dilemma still exists. Every
time the court has to schedule a matter, it will have to inquire into the
President's schedule. The trial judge will have to pass judgment on the
President's priorities, including pressing domestic and foreign demands.
Should a trial court second-guess such decisions, decisions which will
affect not only the executive branch but the entire country? Furthermore,
the trial judge could end up ordering the President of the United States to
rearrange his priorities. 679 What about the admonition against a court
"bandy[ing] [the President] from pillar to post, keep[ing] him constantly
intruding from north to south & east to west, withdraw[ing] him from his
constitutional duties?

' 680

The flexible case management envisioned by the

court of appeals threatens the independence of the executive from the
judicial branch; it throws the notion of separation of powers on its head.
The District Court Has The Discretion To Grant a Stay
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals abused its discretion in invading
the province of the trial court to control its own docket. The district court
stayed the proceedings until Clinton finished his term, and it was beyond
the appellate court's power to interfere with this ruling.
677Jones, 72
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The Supreme Court has established that a district court has "broad
discretion in granting or denying stays so as to 'coordinate the business of
the court efficiently and sensibly."' 681 Furthermore, every court has the
power to "control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy
of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." 682 Such power
comes with limits. Decisions whether to grant a stay must be done in the
exercise of good judgment, 683"weigh[ing] competing interests and
maintain[ing] an even balance."

The Supreme Court provided that the stay must not be of an indefinite
duration unless there is a pressing need.684 But so long as the stay is
reasonable, an individual may have to submit to the delay in the interest of
the public welfare or convenience. 685 With these principles in mind, the
district court's decision was within its discretion, and the stay was proper.
The district court did not stay the proceedings indefinitely; Jones will
have her day in court as soon as President Clinton completes his term of
office. The district court found that in light of Supreme Court precedent
and the doctrine of separation of powers, it is in the public interest to
delay the trial and avoid interference with the President, his constitutional
duties, and the functioning of the entire executive branch.
A stay of the proceedings is analogous to a continuance. The Supreme
Court held in Isaacs v. United States that the action of the trial court
regarding the granting of a continuance is "purely a matter of discretion,
not subject to review ...

unless it clearly appears that the discretion has

686

been abused., In Isaacs, a criminal defendant asked for a continuance
because he did not have one of his witnesses for trial. The record revealed
that the defendant had not attempted to procure the attendance of this
witness and therefore, the trial court denied the motion for a
continuance. 687 The Supreme Court refused to rule whether the denial of
the continuance was proper. It found no abuse of discretion by the trial
court and asserted that interfering with the trial court's
ruling on the issue
688
would be overstepping the role of the appellate court.
689
The Supreme Court affirmed this holding in Ehrlichman v. Sirica.
The case concerned an application by a criminal defendant for a stay of
681
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the proceedings. 690 The reason behind the defendant's petition for a delay
was a risk of prejudicial publicity surrounding the trial.69 1 The Supreme
Court refused to interfere with the trial court's decision. It held that
ordinarily pretrial orders are matters within the judicial discretion of the
trial judge; he is the one presumed to be aware of the case and the factors
which bear upon the relief sought.692 The Court further stated that
"1passing on a claim for ...

delay in a trial because of prejudicial pretrial

publicity calls for the exercise of the highest order of sound judicial
discretion by the district court."693 Doubts about the correctness of a

decision to delay
are not sufficient to form a basis for reversal by the
694
appellate court.

Jones involves a civil suit rather than a criminal prosecution. However,
Sirica is relevant because when making a decision whether to delay a trial,
it is within the trial court's discretion to weigh the possible factors that
may impact the parties to the suit. In Sirica, the trial court found that a
delay was appropriate considering the risk of prejudicial publicity.
Similarly, in Jones, the district court found that, based on Supreme Court
precedent, it must take into consideration the possible impact a trial would
have on the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional duties. 695 This
type of determination is within the trial court's discretion. Therefore, the
court of appeals erred in encroaching on the district court's decision.

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not been consistent in its rulings regarding
immunity for members of the executive branch. However, in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, that the Court singled out the President and afforded him
additional protection over and above that which had been given to the
other officers of the executive branch.696 With that in mind, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals erred in holding that President Clinton must
defend the civil suit filed against him by Paula Jones.
The court of appeals erred in basing its decision solely on the fact that
unofficial acts of executive officials are not protected. The separation of
powers argument is relevant and properly applies to Jones. There is
sufficient support for the notion that in order to maintain the proper
separation of powers required by the Constitution, the judiciary must
refrain from interfering with the effective functioning of the executive
690
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branch. Forcing a President to defend a civil suit while in office is an
intrusion that exceeds the permissible limits of this doctrine. Finally, the
district court historically has had the power to control and manage its
docket. So long as it acts in moderation and with sound judgment, the
court has the discretion to stay a case, and this decision is normally not an
appropriate decision for appellate review. Therefore, it was an abuse of
discretion for the court of appeals to reverse the district court's decision to
stay the proceedings.
EPILOGUE
Since the original writing of this article, President Clinton petitioned
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for a rehearing. The petition was
denied.6 97 However, the Supreme Court has granted Clinton's petition for
writ of certiorari, and the case was heard this term.6 98 A decision will be
handed down this summer.
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